1.

Introduction
Over the 13,000 years since humankind began to move beyond just hunting and gathering, one of the most important micro contributors to economic progress has been innovation in food production (Diamond 1998 ). Even as recently as the period since 1960 the world has seen a major example of that in the so-called 'green revolution'. That revolution initially brought higher-yielding semi-dwarf wheat and rice varieties to vast areas of Asia and other developing regions that had access to irrigation or reliable rainfall, but then it extended to include the adoption of modern varieties also of numerous other grains, root crops and protein crops. The adaption of modern varieties to local conditions by national scientists, and the subsequent gradual adoption by farmers of them, was by no means uniform. In particular, Africa lagged far behind Asia and Latin America, contributing importantly to that continent's relatively slow growth in per capita food production particularly up to the 1990s (Evenson and Gollin 2003) . Given that Africa now accounts for one-third of the world's people living on less than $1 a day (up from one-tenth two decades ago - Chen and Ravallion 2004) , and that the vast majority of those poor people in SubSaharan Africa are dependent on agriculture for their livelihood and much of their food, this has been an opportunity lost for a whole generation for hundreds of millions of people.
In the latter 1990s another agricultural revolution began, this time involving biotechnology including genetic modification (the so-called gene revolution).
Genetically modified (GM) crops have great potential for farmers and ultimately consumers. Benefits for producers could include greater productivity and less occupational health and environmental damage (e.g., fewer pesticides), while benefits to consumers could include not only lower food prices but also enhanced attributes (e.g., 'nutriceuticals'). While traditional biotechnology improves the quality and yields of plants and animals through, for example, selective breeding, genetic engineering enables direct manipulation of genetic material. In this way the new GM technology has the potential to accelerate the development process by shaving years off R&D programs. Protagonists argue that genetic engineering also entails a morecontrolled transfer of genes because the transfer is limited to a single or just a few selected genes, whereas traditional breeding risks transferring unwanted genes together with the desired ones.
This new agricultural biotechnology has been adopted very rapidly where it has been allowed to flourish, but to date that is in just a handful of countries (most notably the US, Canada and Argentina) and so involves only their most important crops (namely maize, soybean and canola) plus cotton.
1 GM varieties of wheat, rice and other food crops would be ready for release were it not for opposition to GM technology by vocal consumer and environmental groups, particularly in Western
Europe, concerned about the GM crops' potentially adverse impacts on food safety (e.g., 'Will they cause cancer?') and the environment (e.g., 'Will they lead to herbicide-resistant superweeds?). The EU responded to pressure from these groups by placing in October 1998 a de facto moratorium on the production and use of GM varieties other than the tiny number approved to that date. Since April 2004 that moratorium has been replaced by GM labelling laws that are so strict as to have almost the same restrictive effect on trade.
As a result of the EU de facto moratorium, the US share of the EU's maize imports has fallen to virtually zero (from around two-thirds in the mid-1990s, close to the US share of world exports), as has Canada's share of EU canola imports (from 54
per cent in the mid-1990s). The fall has been less dramatic in the case of soybean products, but in all three cases the GM-adopting countries have lost market share to GM-free suppliers. As a consequence, countries exporting food products fear that they will find food-importing countries discounting or denying access to their products if their farmers adopt GM technology or even if they import GM food (because of the risk of contamination of domestically produced non-GM food).
This new biotechnology therefore raises a number of dilemmas for African regions following a shock so as to return to equalized expected rates of return.
Production
Traditionally, to distinguish GM from non-GM productivity, outputs of the GM-adopting sectors are each sub-divided into GM and non-GM product. Except for golden rice, an output-augmenting, Hicks-neutral productivity shock is implemented on the GM varieties of these commodities to capture their higher farm productivity. 4 This assumes that GM technology uniformly reduces the level of primary factors needed per unit of food crop output. When a region does not adopt GM technologies, no regional factor productivity shock is included and there is no distinction between GM and non-GM production in these regions. In the constant-elasticity-of-substitution we assume they would also be the earliest adopters of GM rice and wheat once they are ready for commercial release. Those countries' farmers have shown no interest in golden rice, so it is assumed their adoption is restricted to other GM rice varieties.) In the scenarios involving GM rice adoption in developing countries, we consider two cases: one in which 45 per cent of the rice crop is grown with GM seed that enhances farm productivity, and the other in which 45 per cent of the rice crop uses golden rice seed. The latter set of adopting farmers is assumed to be able to segregate their golden rice from other rice in order to market this product based on its enhanced nutritional composition. 5 We also consider a case where some developing countries adopt GM varieties of coarse grains, oilseeds and wheat that are assumed to account for 45 per cent of their production of those crops.
Productivity shocks
The simulations assume GM technical change in grain and oilseed production is Hicks-neutral, involving an output-augmenting productivity shock of 7.5 per cent for coarse grain, 6 per cent for oilseeds and 5 per cent for wheat and rice (Table 1) .
Alternative simulations were conducted to assess the importance of altering these assumptions to allow for biased technical change, but because the welfare results are not substantially different we retained the simpler Hicks-neutral assumption. golden rice-adopting Asian developing economies. Given the low nutrition levels of poor workers in Africa, and the fact that if golden rice were to be adopted in Asia and 5 The cost of segregation would be smaller, the more rice is consumed by the producing household or sold to local consumers, as is common in developing countries. This situation is thus qualitatively different from that analyzed by Lapan and Moschini (2004) where the costs of segregation and identity preservation are assumed to be significant. 6 The results from sensitivity analysis are available from the authors.
Africa then nutritionally enhanced GM varieties of wheat and other foods would soon follow, we assume the productivity of unskilled labour would rise by 2 per cent following adoption of second-generation GM crops. We also assume no direct impact on the productivity of skilled labourers, who are rich enough to already enjoy a nutritious diet. 7 And to continue to err on the conservative side, we assume secondgeneration GM crop varieties are no more productive in the use of factors and inputs than traditional varieties net of segregation and identity preservation costs, even though there is evidence to suggest they may indeed be input-saving.
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Consumption
In order to capture consumer aversion to GM products in OECD countries, elasticities of substitution between GM and non-GM products in those regions are set at low levels. 9 Once nutritionally enhanced GM grain varieties are introduced, consumers in Sub-Saharan Africa are assumed to have a preference for them over their traditional counterparts. For simplicity and to continue to be conservative, we ignore the possibility that consumers of inferior grains might shift to these new grains and instead just represent the consumer response as involving demand for traditional rice or wheat shrinking by 45 per cent so that the nutritionally enhanced variety accounts for 45 per cent of total demand for that cereal in adopting countries. And we assume the consumer health benefits of second-generation GM varieties are confined to the adopting countries.
Scenarios
The base simulation in the GTAP model, which is calibrated to 1997, is Finally, the fourth set of simulations repeats some of the second set except the GM rice and wheat is nutritionally enhanced and so it boosts all unskilled labour productivity in Sub-Saharan Africa by 2 per cent instead of boosting just farm productivity:
Sim 4a: As for 2a + Sub-Saharan Africa adopts second-generation GM rice and wheat that enhances health and thereby the productivity of unskilled labour in the region Sim 4b: As for 4a + the EU bans imports of those crops from GM-adopting countries.
These simulations, which are summarized in Table 2 , are clearly only a small subset of possible simulations, but they are chosen to illustrate the main choices facing Sub-Saharan Africa.
Results
The estimated national economic welfare effects of the first set of these shocks are summarized in Table 3 . Table 3) because their exports of grass-fed livestock products are less competitive with nowcheaper grain-fed livestock products in GM-adopting countries. But so too do the non-SADC countries of Sub-Saharan Africa as a group, although again only slightly.
South Africa gains slightly as a net importer of coarse grains and oilseeds, while the net welfare effect on the rest of SADC is negligible.
Column 2 of Table 3 shows the effects when the EU's moratorium is taken into account. The gains to the adopting countries are one-third less, the EU loses instead of gains (not accounting for the value EU consumers place on being certain they are not consuming food containing GMOs), and the world as a whole would be worse off (by $1.2 billion per year, instead of better off by $2.3 billion, a difference of $3.5 billion) because the gains from the new technology would be more than offset by the massive increase in agricultural protectionism in the EU due to its import restrictions on those crops from GM-adopting American countries. For SSA, however, welfare would be $20 million p.a. greater than in Sim 1a because in Sim 1b
African farmers are able to sell into the EU with less competition from the Western Hemisphere.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 are the same as columns 1 and 2 except that SACU is assumed also to adopt GM coarse grains and oilseeds. In the absence of the EU moratorium this would benefit SACU an extra $6 million p.a. while helping the rest of SSA by $1 million (compare Sims 1a and 1c). However, in the presence of the EU ban, SACU would be $2 million worse off and the rest of SSA $3 million better off (compare Sims 1b and 1d).
Column 5 of Table 3 Table 3 ).
The above numbers are small, but recall they refer to adoption only of GM varieties currently in production. If GM rice and wheat adoption also were to be allowed, global welfare would be increased by nearly twice as much (compare bottom right-hand corners of Tables 3 and 4 : $7.5 versus $4.0 billion), because the market for those two crops is even larger than for coarse grains and oilseeds. Again, though, SSA economies would gain little if they do not participate, with the benefit in terms of enhanced competitiveness from abstaining in the presence of the EU moratorium being very minor relative to the foregone productivity benefits from adopting the new technology.
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This last point is reinforced in Table 5 where, in Sims 3a and 3b, SADC members other than SACU place a ban on imports of products that may contain GMOs, while in Sim 3c they embrace the technology. In the first two cases SACU is It is instructive to focus also on the impacts on domestic food prices and quantities in the Rest of SADC in this third set of simulations. Table 6 reveals the extent to which domestic food production would be greater but by more in Sim 3b
where the Rest of SADC chooses not to adopt, and to ban GM imports, than in Sim 3c 11 In this as in all the simulations, there is an implicit assumption that, if government policies allowed, the technology would be developed by biotech corporations for each of the regions concerned and the GM seed varieties would be sold to adopting farmers to provide the net productivity gains reported in Table 1 . Those seed firms are too small a fraction of the global economy to include in the model.
where it embraces the new technology. This is the standard consequence of increasing agricultural protectionism, reflected also in the greater decline in net imports of food in Sim 3b than 3c, and in the increase in domestic food prices in Sim 3b compared with their decline in Sim 3c.
Finally, consider the situation where the GM varieties of rice and wheat that are adopted in Sub-Saharan Africa are nutritionally enhancing to the extent of boosting the health and hence productivity of unskilled workers regardless of occupation, rather than raising farm productivity as with first-generation GM varieties. Table 7 suggests this second-generation GM technology could have a major impact on poor people's welfare: its estimated gain is 18 times as great as it would be if the GM varieties were just farm productivity enhancing (compare Sims 2e and 4a).
And again, this startling result is independent of whether the EU maintains its current moratorium (compare Sims 4a and 4b).
The welfare results for all of these simulations are decomposed for SubSaharan African regions in Table 8 , to show the extent to which they derive from productivity growth, from a change in the region's international terms of trade, or from a change in the economic efficiency of resource allocation in the region given its policy distortions. All three elements play a role in determining the overall welfare impacts, but the contribution of productivity growth dominates in all regions where GM adoption occurs -especially in the case of nutritionally enhancing varieties.
Caveats
As with all CGE modelling results, the above are subject to a number of qualifications. One has to do with the way consumer preferences are handled. The estimated market and welfare effects vary with the elasticities of substitution assumed between GM and non-GM varieties of a product. Of more importance is that we have no satisfactory way of valuing any loss of welfare for consumers who would like to avoid consuming foods containing GMOs but cannot if such foods are introduced into their marketplace without credible labelling. Since we have assumed that loss to be zero, we are overstating the gains from adopting this technology to that extent. An alternative way to cope with this issue is to introduce a cost of segregation and identity preservation. We did that implicitly by choosing conservative cost savings due to the new technology, saying they were net of any fees charged for segregation and identity preservation.
According to Burton et al. (2002) such fees may be as high as 15 per cent of farm gate price, which would make it unprofitable to market many GM varieties if that was a required condition of sale. Others suggest those costs could be miniscule -at least in developed economies -on the grounds that such segregation is increasingly being demanded by consumers of many conventional foods anyway (e.g., different grades or varieties or attributes of each crop) so the marginal cost of expanding such systems to handle GM-ness would not be great, at least in countries that have already shown a willingness to pay for product differentiation.
The version of the GTAP database used in the above modelling does not include tariff preferences enjoyed by Africans exporting to the EU. In so far as they enjoy preferences on the products considered above, then African exporters are currently receiving the domestic EU price minus trading costs (including the share of the tariff rent enjoyed by the importing firms). That price would be raised by the EU moratorium, but whether that rise would be greater or less than the rise in the international price of GM-free varieties sold to the EU under MFN conditions is unclear. In practice this issue is likely to be of minor importance though, for two reasons. On is that the EU's MFN tariffs on coarse grains and oilseeds are low and hence so is the margin of preference. The other is that many exporters find the rules of origin so complicated that it is cheaper for them just to pay the MFN import duty rather than try to take advantage of preferences.
In all these simulations we assume for simplicity that there are no negative environmental risks net of positive environmental benefits associated with producing GM crops, and that there is no discounting and/or loss of market access abroad for other food products because of what GM adoption does for a country's generic reputation as a producer of 'clean, green, safe food'.
We have ignored the owners of intellectual property in GM varieties, and simply assumed the productivity advantage of GM varieties is net of the higher cost of GM seeds. In so far as that intellectual property is held by a firm in a country other than the GM-adopting country, then the gain from adoption is slightly overstated in the adopting country (and very slightly understated for the home regions of the relevant multinational biotech companies).
It is difficult to know how close to the mark is our assumed boost to unskilled labour productivity following adoption of second-generation GM varieties. But even if it is a gross exaggeration, discounting heavily the massive magnitude of the estimated welfare gain from adopting such varieties would still leave us with a large benefit -particularly bearing in mind that developing countries are being offered this technology at no cost by its private sector developers, and that we have included no valuation of the non-pecuniary gain in well-being for sufferers of malnutrition. The cost of adapting the off-the-shelf technology to local conditions in Africa may well be non-trivial, however, and may require a better-functioning agricultural research system than has operated in the past four decades (as evidenced by Africa's relatively poor take-up of the previous green revolution -see Evenson and Gollin 2003) .
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the above comparative static modelling assumes first-generation GM technology delivers just a one-off increase in total factor productivity (TFP) for that portion of a crop's area planted to the GM varieties. But what is more likely is that, if/when the principle of GM crop production is accepted, there would be an increase in the rate of agricultural TFP growth into the future.
Similarly, second-generation GM varieties with additional health attributes such as those associated with golden rice would be quicker in coming on stream the more countries embraced the technology. And biotech firms would be encouraged to invest more in non-food GM crop varieties too (adding to the success already achieved with GM cotton) if there was an embracing of currently developed GM crop varieties by Sub-Saharan African and other developing countries. Hence the present value of future returns from GM adoption may be many times the numbers shown above. For that reason, care is needed in interpreting cases where our results suggest that when rich countries introduce trade barriers against GM products, food-importing developing countries benefit. This is because our analysis does not take into account that moratoria have slowed the investment in agricultural biotechnology, and so reduced future market and technological spillovers to developing countries from that prospective R&D.
Conclusions
From the viewpoint of Sub-Saharan Africa, the above results are good news.
The GM crop technology promises much to the countries willing to adopt these new varieties. The first-generation, farm-productivity enhancing GM varieties alone will boost welfare in the adopting countries, and those welfare gains could be multiplied - 
